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This paper investigates the impact of banking and submission constraints, set by
the EU Emission Trading Scheme, on the e¢ ciency of the carbon permits spot market
using intra-daily data. My aim is to identify whether there is a Disposition e⁄ect in
the spot market. I will examine a data set that includes spot prices for the First and
Second Phases of the Scheme from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009. I ￿nd that the
Disposition e⁄ect is signi￿cantly high at the beginning of each Phase and decreases
close to the ￿rst compliance event. In the light of these results I propose a lifting of
the ban on banking between Phases and an increased emissions information disclosure
in order to increase the e¢ ciency of the Scheme.
JEL Classi￿cation: G11, G18, D84, Q48
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1 Introduction
The aim of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is to set up a platform for
achieving a target reduction of CO2 emissions in the most e¢ cient way. In order to achieve
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1the emissions target, each installation receives carbon permits on a yearly basis, which can
be traded at one of the existing environmental trading platforms. The permits are valid
only within the allocated Phase, and banking of permits between phases is not allowed.1 By
the end of March installations are required to submit enough permits to cover their yearly
emissions. These institutional constraints allow installations to plan their investments and
to also neutralise the irregularities of CO2 emission levels within each Phase.
However, such institutional constraints have also a negative e⁄ect on the e¢ ciency of
the market. Daskalakis et al. (2008) suggest that the behaviour of the carbon market is
not consistent with weak-form e¢ ciency according to which all the information contained in
past prices is re￿ ected in the current price. The authors demonstrate that permit returns are
serially predictable and that simple trading strategies can be employed in order to produce
substantial pro￿ts. The authors argued that one of the reasons that the carbon market is
not e¢ cient could be due to the restrictions imposed on permits banking. Spot prices for
carbon permits also exhibit high volatility, where the highest decline followed the release of
veri￿ed emissions in April 2006. Betz et al. (2006) suggest that spot price volatility has a
profound impact on long-term investment risk and in turn can also a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of
the carbon market.
These institutional constraints can, therefore, have a potential negative e⁄ect on carbon
market e¢ ciency. Despite the importance of the topic, there is a scarcity of literature
that analyses the role of institutional constraints in price dynamics and carbon market
e¢ ciency. Borak et al. (2006) ￿nd an overall increasing price volatility with an increase
in maturity. These surprising results contradict the time to maturity e⁄ect that suggests
a decline of price volatility as maturity increases. According to the authors these ￿ndings
suggest that there is a high uncertainty in the market, which can result from the uncertainty
with regard to the future allocation of the permits. Daskalakis et al. (2009) suggest, without
providing empirical evidence, that the prohibition of banking permits between phases can
have signi￿cant implications on the pricing of permits derivatives. The authors propose to
lift the ban on banking in order to decrease the uncertainty in the market. Unrestricted
1The First Phase covers the period form 2005 to 2007; the Second Phase covers the period from 2008 to
2012.
2banking, in their opinion, increases e¢ ciency in the market and leads to emissions reduction
at the least possible cost. Chevallier et al. (2008) show that in the carbon market there is
a relation between the institutional constraints and the modi￿cation of investors￿subjective
beliefs. The authors found a signi￿cant change in the risk aversion of traders in April 2006,
when the actual ￿gures on emissions were ￿rst published. However, the above studies do
not provide an explanation for how those institutional constraints a⁄ect the evolution of the
carbon permits price.
It is worth mentioning, however, those few studies that investigate the evolution of the
carbon permits price. Bunn and Fezzi (2007) show that the price of permits and the price
of energy in the UK have a major role in formulating each others￿equilibrium price. The
authors indicate that the permits price reacts quickly to shocks in gas prices; however, the
pass through of shock in permits price to the electricity market is much slower. Extreme
weather conditions are identi￿ed as one of the fundamental factors that determine permits
price (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007). Indeed, extreme temperatures a⁄ect the demand for
energy. For instance, in cold winters there is an increased demand for heating. As a result,
power generators increase their emissions and in turn the demand for permits increases as
well. The signi￿cant e⁄ect of industrial indices on the determination of permits price is
demonstrated by Alberola et al. (2007). The authors show that the price of permits reacts
to the economic activity of the main sectors that are covered by the ETS. They point out
that the announcement of the European Commission on veri￿ed emissions in 2006 revealed
that prior to the announcement, trading had been based more on anticipation rather than
the fundamental price mechanism. Benz et al. (2009) propose that due to di⁄erent regimes
in carbon price and volatility behaviour of returns, the AR-GARCH model outperforms
constant volatility models.
Although the carbon permit is not a pure ￿nancial commodity in the usual sense as it
expires at the end of each Phase, there seems to be a general consensus that it should be
studied as such (among others see Kosobud et al., 2002, Daskalakis et al., 2009, Benz et al.,
2009). Explanations of the anomalies in the ￿nancial market can, therefore, assist in clari-
fying the role of the ￿nancial institutions￿constraints in the context of the carbon market.
One of the extensive ￿elds of empirical ￿nance incorporates psychological biases into the
3analysis of investment decision making. One of the most documented psychological anom-
alies in ￿nancial literature is that of the Disposition e⁄ect. Disposition-prone investors tend
to hold on to their losing assets, and realise their winning assets (Shefrin et al., 1985). This
tendency contradicts the rational behaviour of the market, where investors hold their win-
ning assets and get rid of their losing assets. Another documented anomaly is the tendency
of investors not to react to news, which creates a drift in price and return predictability.
The risk aversion of the Prospect Theory type (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) together with
mental accounting explains both the Disposition e⁄ect (Grinblatt and Han, 2005) and the
delayed reaction to news in the market (Frazzini, 2006).
In the light of the existing literature it seems that there is a place to analyse the e⁄ect of
the Prospect type risk aversion, speci￿cally the Disposition e⁄ect, on the pricing mechanism
of carbon permits. I will contribute to the existing literature by evaluating the link between
institutional constraints and the Disposition e⁄ect in the carbon market. I will investigate
whether there is a change in the Disposition e⁄ect around compliance events of the First
and Second Phases and towards the end of the First Phase. To perform my analysis I use
a data set of intraday data from the BlueNext exchange platform (BlueNext Spot EUA
05-07, BlueNext Spot EUA 08-12, BlueNext Spot CER) a historical transactions data set
recorded since 24 June 2005. Unlike Benz et al. (2009) and Chevallier et al. (2008) who
use the GARCH process, I will use the ARMA process, which delivers estimations without
remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. I will also use an additional dummy variable
of capital gains that captures the Disposition e⁄ect in the market. To construct a capital
gains variable I will follow a methodology proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005). The
authors show that disposition behaviour, where investors tend to hold their losing assets,
has a predictive power on future returns. The use of high frequency data is necessary for a
reasonable approximation of capital gains (Grinblatt and Han, 2005). High frequency data
allows me to trace changes in Disposition that occur during the daily trade.
My ￿ndings suggest that the Disposition e⁄ect holds throughout the two sample periods.
I have ￿nd that the Disposition e⁄ect signi￿cantly decreases after April 2006 and 2007, after
the publication of veri￿ed emissions by the European Commissioner. These ￿ndings suggest
that the compliance event that occurs between March and April has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
4shaping the behaviour of market participants. Speci￿cally, the availability of information
on total emissions contributes to the rational behaviour of the carbon market participants.
My ￿ndings also show that after the ￿rst compliance event of the Second Phase the Disposi-
tion e⁄ect stabilises and remains constant throughout the rest of the period. These ￿ndings
strengthen the argument that the ￿rst compliance event has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the evo-
lution of the carbon spot price and in turn the e¢ ciency of the carbon market. Opposed to
the proposition of Daskalakis et al. (2009), however, my ￿nding shows no evidence of the
e⁄ect of banking constraints on the risk perception in the market.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the EU ETS
structure, the BlueNext exchange platform and the data. Section 3 speci￿es the econometric
model and discusses the results. I will also perform a robustness analysis of the results where
various speci￿cations of model and independent variables yield similar qualitative results.
In section 4, I will test the relevance of institutional constraints in the context of the carbon
market and provide policy recommendations. In Section 5 I present my conclusions.
2 EU ETS and BlueNext
The EU has introduced the Emission Trading Scheme to comply with the international
emissions target commitment set by the Kyoto Protocol. The ETS is the ￿rst trading scheme
to operate on the international scale so as to tackle global warming concerns. Each member
state in the EU can achieve its obligations of reducing the total national emissions by using
one of the ￿ exible mechanisms set by the Protocol. Permits trading is one among the three
mechanisms.2 The ￿rst trade in carbon permits took place in 2005, three years prior to
the protocol commitment period. The ￿rst three years of the scheme operation, which are
usually referred to as First Phase (2005-2007), were aimed at adjusting the market to the
emissions trade and smoothing the transactions of the market to the Protocol commitment
period. This corresponds to the Second Phase (2008-2012) of the ETS. Each member state
submits, prior to each Phase, its National Allocation Plan for approval by the European
2Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are additional mechanisms that aim to reduce
emissions through projects that reduce emissions in foreign countries.
5High Commissioner. The purpose of a NAP is to describe the allocation rules that govern
the initial allocation of permits to installations, and the total of CO2 that member states
are to extract during each Phase. The total of emissions is referred to as a cap.
Most of the states chose to allocate their cap according to a relative historical bench-
mark, a method often labelled as grandfathering. For instance, according to the UK NAP
for the Second Phase, allocation to installations is based on their relative production prior
to the Phase, speci￿cally during the period 2003-2005.3Each permit allows extracting one
tonne of CO2 during the allocated Phase. An allocated permit expires at the end of each
Phase, and the owner of the permit cannot bank it to cover emissions that are generated in a
di⁄erent Phase.4 The member states allocate permits to installations on a yearly basis, and
the latter must submit enough permits to cover their yearly emissions. In April, when the
submission process is over, the European High Commissioner publishes the veri￿ed ￿gures
of emissions for the previous year.5 The trade of the permits is open to the public. How-
ever, only a few sectors are covered by the NAPs. Only those installations whose historic
production/emissions are above a predetermined threshold have to submit permits to cover
their emissions.
There are currently a few trading platforms that allow the trade of emissions permits.
Futures, options and Certi￿ed Emission Reduction (CER)6 are among the possible trading
opportunities, in addition to the spot market available to traders. BlueNext Spot EUA is
one of the leading spot exchanges for EU carbon permits with over 60 per cent of the market
share in the spot exchange. It was founded by NYSE Euronext and Caisse des Depots, in
December 2007. It consists of 101 members and has a 95 per cent market share. Futures and
spots on EU permits as well as CER are traded on BlueNext. Cash held on account earns
an interest rate of the Euro Overnight Index Average minus an eighth. The price tick is 0.01
3For a detailed description of NAP of the member states please visit the EU website:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm.htm
4However, banking within the Phase is permitted.
5It is evident that the allocation of allowances for the First Phase of EU ETS has been too generous, as it
is argued by environmental groups. This argument is debated by Ellerman and Buchner (2008). The authors
argue that installations that abate for pro￿t purposes would be considered as being in excess of permits.
6For more information on CER please see: http://unfccc.int/2860.php.
6e/t, and the minimum price is 0.01 e/t. The volume tick is 1,000 tons and the minimum
volume tick is 1,000 tons. Its trading hours are between 8:00 AM to 5:30 PM (UTC+1),
from Monday to Friday. The delivery and settlement operated by BlueNext is in real time.
Delivery consists of the transfer of the underlying permits from the seller￿ s account to the
buyer￿ s account via a BlueNext transit account in the French registry for the EUA.7
2.1 Data description and regression
My data consists of a data set provided by BlueNext. The data set contains data of the spot
prices and traded volumes of permits, including information about the date, time of trade
and traded volume. The data is an irregular spread in time intra daily closing spot price
from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009 amounting to total of 40,339 observations. The data
set include data on permits for the First (BlueNext Spot EUA 05-07) and Second Phases
(BlueNext Spot EUA 08-12), as well as some observations on CERs. I have divided the data
set into two sets with observations related to the First and Second Phases. I do so in order
to identify the e⁄ect of psychological biases on the price of permits for the First in contrast
to the Second Phases. After excluding from the data set observations related to trade of
CERs, in order to concentrate only on the price evolution of permits, the total number of
observations is 37,924.
I denote Pt to be the spot price of carbon permit observation at time t. The log returns
of carbon spot prices at time t is rt = log
Pt+2
Pt . In order to account for high trading activity
during the opening and closure of the market, I consider volatility adjusted returnse rt = rt
sT
where sT denotes standard deviation of returns on the day rt is observed. This way I
construct a time series of standardised returns for the First and Second Phases, where the
former consists of 4,927 and the latter of 32,997 observations. Figures 1 and 2 display the
series of standardised log returns for both the First and Second Phases, respectfully.
7The complete description of BlueNext is available at http://www.bluenext.eu/.
73 Disposition e⁄ect
In this section I will test whether in the market for carbon permits there exists a signi￿cant
Disposition e⁄ect on the dynamics of carbon log returns.8 In what follows, I describe the
capital gain speci￿cation of Grinblatt and Han (2005) and the statistical model. I conclude
this section by performing a robust analysis which shows that my ￿ndings are robust to a
di⁄erent sampling, model and variable speci￿cation.
Table 1 documents the sample mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median,
skewness and kurtosis of the standardised log returns variable e rt. In the First Phase the
log returns variable exhibits a slight deviation from the normal distribution by displaying a
slight positive excess kurtosis, due to the high concentration of log returns around zero. In
addition, log returns in the First Phase exhibit a slight positive skew. In contrast, in the
Second Phase the standardised log returns exhibit a very high positive skew as well as a
high kurtosis in comparison to the First phase. This may be due to a higher concentration
of positive log returns in the Second Phase. Table 1 also reports a signi￿cantly high positive
autocorrelation in the ￿rst lag for both First and Second Phases. There is no evidence for
volatility clustering in the standardised log returns (Figures 1 and 2) in contrast to normal
log returns (Figure 3 and 4). The latter suggests that volatility clustering in the log returns
is mainly due to di⁄erent regimes in daily trading activity.
I employ an ARMA speci￿cation to account for the autocorrelation in the log returns and
unobserved shocks in the market. I will also consider a dummy variable for capital gains,
which I will construct using a method similar to the one used by Grinblatt and Han (2005).
As in Grinblatt and Han, I will construct a costs basis Rt as a proxy for the reference price
of the permits portfolio. However, I lack the information on the real identity of the permit













[1 ￿ Vt￿n+￿] is a probability that a
permit has been purchased at date t￿n and Vt is a turnover ratio. However, unlike Grinbaltt
and Han, I propose an alternative proxy for the turnover variable Vt at each point of time
8For evidence of the e⁄ect of psychological bias on the dynamics of prices in emerging markets see, among
others, Tan et al., 2008 and Chen et al., 2007.
8t. The proxy that I will use consists of the total number of traded permits the day the
observation t is taken and the total number of traded permits at each observation point t.
Vt is the proxy for turnover ratio, which represents the probability of buying an additional
asset and is expressed in the following manner:
Vt =
Total of traded permits at each observation point t
Total of traded permits the day observation t is taken
I de￿ne capital gains gt at time t as the log of the spot price of carbon permit Pt and the
reference price Rt, which is gt = log Pt
Rt. Similar to Grinblatt and Han (2005) I employ
gt￿1 instead of gt in the regression so as to avoid market microstructure e⁄ect, such as bid-
ask bounce. To evaluate the Disposition e⁄ect in the carbon market, I have employed an
ARMA(1,1) speci￿cation where I include the capital gain proxy variable gt:This gives way
to
rt = +￿gt￿1 + ￿rt￿1 + "t + ’"t￿1 (1)
where "t is iid. The capital gains coe¢ cient ￿ represents the Disposition e⁄ect on the logre-
turns. According to the theoretical framework of Grinblatt and Han (2005), the Disposition
e⁄ect prevails in the market if the coe¢ cient ￿ > 0.
3.1 Estimation results
I estimate by least-squares Equations (1) for the series of log returns for the First and Second
Phases. I report the results in Table 3. I have employed the ARMA(1,1) process, as the latter
copes better with autocorrelation in the residuals than the AR(1) process. The Q-statistics
of the Ljung-Box test (1978) show that an MA(1) component is necessary to cope with the
￿rst order autoregressive structure in the log returns for two Phases. The results of the
Ljung-Box test (1978) show no evidence of a remaining autocorrelation in the residuals up
to the 13th order. I proceed, therefore, to the analysis of the estimates. All of the coe¢ cients
reported in Table 3 are signi￿cant.
Table 3 also reports that there is a signi￿cant momentum which arises from the strategies
that form portfolios from the ￿rst autoregressive and moving average components ￿ and ’,
9respectively. However, the most important result comes from the variable of capital gains.
The signi￿cant coe¢ cient of ￿ suggests that there is a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on the
returns coming from the capital gains variable. This is consistent with the Disposition e⁄ect
reported by Grinblatt and Han (2005). Altogether, my ￿ndings indicate that during the
First and Second Phases of ETS the price of carbon permits is a⁄ected by the Disposition
tendency of traders in the market.
3.2 Robustness analysis
To evaluate the sensitivity of my ￿ndings I will perform a robustness analysis of the predicted
coe¢ cient on capital gains. In particular, I will test whether there are qualitative changes
in the coe¢ cient due to variations in the sample period, capital gains variable and model
speci￿cations. First, I will divide the data set into ￿ve subsamples: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
and 2009. The main goal is to show that during all the sub-periods of First and Second Phases
of the Scheme capital gains have a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on the log returns. Results of
the Ljung-Box test (1978) in Table 4 show no evidence for the remaining autocorrelation
in the residuals. The capital gains variable is still positive and signi￿cant. This suggests
that my ￿ndings are robust to the sampling of the data. Another interesting feature of the
subsample results is that there is a signi￿cantly high e⁄ect coming from the capital gains at
the beginning of the each Phase. These latter ￿ndings may suggest that during the ￿rst year
of each Phase market participants, on average, are more Disposition-prone than during the
rest of the Phase. This may be due to the novelty of the market and/or commodity during
the First Phase and the lack of information on the commodity price fundamentals during
the Second Phase. As the market becomes more mature, the Disposition e⁄ect diminishes.
Secondly, I will consider an alternative capital gains variable that tests the sensitivity
of my results to a di⁄erent speci￿cation of the capital gains variable. To construct a new
reference, instead of using reference Rt; I will set my reference to be a maximum past price
(Heath et al., 1999). I will take a maximum of the past 30 observations to be my alternative
reference f Rt = max(Pt￿30;Pt￿1):The new capital gains variable is, therefore, e gt = log Pt
f Rt.
Table 4 shows that the alternative speci￿cation of the capital gains does not a⁄ect the
10qualitative result which suggests that the capital gains variable is positive and signi￿cant in
both Phases. I, therefore, conclude that the signi￿cant predictive power of the capital gains
is not an artefact of the way I have constructed it.
Thirdly, I will test whether my results are due to the standardisation of log returns. Table
2 documents the sample mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median, skewness
and kurtosis of the log returns variable rt. The log returns variable exhibits a positive excess
kurtosis both in the First and Second Phases, due to the high concentration of log returns
around zero. In addition, log returns in the First Phase exhibit negative skew, due to a
larger concentration of negative log returns. However, in the Second Phase the log returns
exhibit positive skew, due to a larger concentration of positive log returns. Table 2 also
reports signi￿cantly high positive autocorrelation in the ￿rst two lags for First and Second
Phases (in addition to the volatility clustering which is evident from Figure 3 and 4). I will,
therefore, employ an ARMA(1,1)-GARCH speci￿cation to estimate the evolution of carbon
spot log returns similar to Benz et al., (2009) who consider AR-GARCH and Borak et al.,
(2006) who consider MA-GARCH speci￿cations. I will employ an ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1)
speci￿cation to account for the autoregressive component in addition to volatility clustering
in the log returns. As before, I will include the capital gain variable gt: This gives way to
rt = ￿0 + +￿1gt + ￿1rt￿1 + "t + ’1"t￿1 (2)
"t = ut￿t (3)
￿
2





where "t ￿ iid(0;1). Table 5 reports the estimated coe¢ cients of Equation (2). Although the
ARMA-GARCH speci￿cation cannot cope with autocorrelation in the residuals, the overall
results indicate that there is a signi￿cant Disposition e⁄ect in the market both in the First
and the Second Phases.
To conclude, my results provide robust evidence of the Disposition e⁄ect in the carbon
market during the First and Second Phases. It is my next task to provide an explanation
as to the cause of such an e⁄ect and how to diminish it. In the next section I suggest that
11the institutional constraints of the Scheme are the main cause for increasing the Disposition
e⁄ect in the market.
4 Institutional Constraints
In this section I will estimate Equation (1) for changes in the capital gains variable due to
institutional constraints. The most important institutional features of the ETS are twofold:
￿rstly, there is a statutory obligation for installations to submit their veri￿ed emissions by
the end of March each year. The installations are obliged to submit enough permits to cover
their yearly emissions. By the end of April, actual emissions ￿gures are revealed to the
market. The market, however, learns of the actual emissions prior to the publication of the
actual emissions when the market is updated with the actual emissions ￿gures. From the
demand for permits in the carbon market, the traders can learn whether the market has a
surplus or de￿cit of permits. If there is, therefore, a strong signal in the market of the real
value of the permits, it can diminish the e⁄ect of psychological biases on the carbon price
during and/or after the publication of o¢ cial ￿gures for the total emissions levels.
Secondly, there is a ban on permits banking between First and Second Phases.9 There
is an argument in the literature that the banking prohibition has an e⁄ect on the e¢ ciency
of the carbon market (Daskalakis et al., 2008). This e⁄ect, however, has not been tested so
far and no direct evidence points to that. The argument in favour of abandoning the ban is
that during the transition period between Phases, there is a loss of installations￿￿ exibility to
adhere to the emissions limitation and the ban on banking can increase ine¢ ciency towards
the end of each Phase. This constraint, in turn, a⁄ects the e¢ ciency of the trade (Schleich
et al., 2006). In addition, at the beginning of each Phase market participants have to re-
establish their expectations and learn the new commodity mechanism. This in turn creates
uncertainty and may increase psychological biases at the beginning of each Phase.
In order to detect how these institutional constraints a⁄ect the price evolution in the
market, I will conduct a two-step analysis. Firstly, I will trace the evolution of estimates for
the capital gains coe¢ cient throughout the First and Second Phases. Figures 5 and 6 provide
9Banking is suggested for the Third Phase of ETS.
12a plot of ￿ for the capital gains estimator for both First and Second Phases, respectively.
Figure 5 shows a dramatic jump downwards which indicates a structural break in the data
during the ￿rst compliance event in April 2006. This coincides with the release of o¢ cial
￿gures for total emissions. These results are in line with ￿ndings reported by Chevallier et
al. (2008) who detected a dramatic change in the market perception of risk during the 2006
compliance event. After the ￿rst compliance event the coe¢ cient slightly increased up until
the second compliance event in April 2007, and decreased toward the end of the First Phase.
Figure 6 shows no dramatic changes occurred in the Second Phase. The plot of ￿ coe¢ cient,
however, stabilised after the ￿rst compliance event in April 2008. In addition, Figure 5 and
6 indicate that at the beginning of each Phase the ￿ coe¢ cients were signi￿cantly higher
than during the rest of the Phase and decreasing toward the ￿rst compliance event.
Secondly, I will divide the data set into three subsamples categories: Jan-Feb, Mar-Apr
and the rest of the year. The ￿rst two subsamples detect changes in the Disposition e⁄ect
before and during the submission of veri￿ed emissions, respectively. Whereas the latter
subsample distinguishes the magnitude of Disposition during the rest of the year from the
two submission periods, Tables 6 and 7 report the results. It is evident from the results
that during the Mar-Apr subsamples for the First and Second Phases capital gains variables
are signi￿cantly lower than during the preceding year subsamples. This coincides with the
results of the two plots of ￿ coe¢ cient.
These ￿ndings suggest that, whereas banking prohibition increases Disposition in the
market at the beginning of each phase, the ￿rst compliance events signi￿cantly diminish it
and contribute to the stabilisation of market expectations. Such behaviour of the capital
gains coe¢ cient can be attributed to the degree of information uncertainty in the market.
The literature recognises that psychological biases are increasing under conditions of higher
information uncertainty (Hirshleifer, 2001; Daniel et al., 2001 and Zhang, 2006). When
the market learns its real position, fewer participants are subject to psychological biases.
This explanation is also in line with the framework proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005).
According to the authors, the smaller the number of investors who are subject to Disposition,
the smaller their e⁄ect on the market price.
These results validate the proposition that institutional structure has an e⁄ect on the
13e¢ ciency of the carbon market, which is transformed to a high Disposition e⁄ect, as I have
reported above. The results point out that Disposition in the carbon market is a factor of
information uncertainty, especially during the ￿rst year of each Phase. In addition, the above
results indicate that the ￿rst compliance event has a vital role in shaping the expectations in
the market, by stabilising and/or diminishing the Disposition in the market. The question
that arises is how to eliminate, or at the very least diminish, the Disposition in the market.
The purpose of the next section is to address these questions.
4.1 Discussion and analysis
In previous sections I have demonstrated that the price trend in the market for carbon
permits can be explained by assuming psychological biases, speci￿cally, the Disposition e⁄ect.
It is not surprising to ￿nd the Disposition e⁄ect in the market of carbon permits in light of
extensive evidence, which tracks this phenomenon in ￿nancial markets. In the context of the
carbon market, however, these results should receive major attention. The policy designer
should seek and eliminate the Disposition that a⁄ects trade of carbon permits. Identifying
the source of the Disposition e⁄ect in the institutional structure of the Scheme should allow
the policy maker to diminish its e⁄ect and increase the e¢ ciency of the carbon market.
As I have pointed out in the previous section, institutional constraints on the installation
during the First and Second Phases of the Scheme operation, such as yearly submission and
a ban on banking of permits, are the main drivers of the Disposition e⁄ect. Policy makers
who wish to achieve emissions abatement in the most e¢ cient manner should, therefore, not
disregard these ￿ndings. These results point out that the carbon market, which should create
an e¢ cient environment for trade of carbon permits, is not e¢ cient due to those constraints.
Similar results have already been pointed out by Daskalakis et al. (2008) and Chevallier et
al. (2008).
The above results indicate that before the ￿rst compliance event the Disposition e⁄ect
is higher than during the rest of the year. As I suggested above, this could be due to
information uncertainty. One suggestion that may reduce the Disposition in the market is to
make the information on the emissions level public. Installations that trade carbon permits
14should reveal their emissions intensity and make it publicly accessible throughout the year
rather than once a year. A similar method is already practiced in the stock exchange market
where publicly traded companies are required to make their information public on a regular
basis. It seems reasonable to make emissions levels publicly known as the bene￿t would be
in the highly e¢ cient carbon trading platform, which would bene￿t both the installations,
for having an e¢ cient trading platform, and the public, in the way of an e¢ cient abatement
system.
Another way of reducing the information uncertainty as to the market position with
respect to the carbon permits would be by engaging installations to submit permits to cover
their emissions more frequently than once a year (a frequency that is suggested by current
practice). This way the information gets to the market more frequently. This may eliminate
such dramatic changes in the market expectations as were evident during the First Phase. It
may also reduce the uncertainty in the market and in turn reduce the e⁄ect of psychological
biases on the carbon price in a more consistent way, without creating unnecessary shocks to
the system. The information uncertainty is to be diminished to make way for the e¢ cient
market of carbon permits. Reducing the uncertainty by revealing the information may reduce
the psychological biases of the traders and create a more e¢ cient market. These suggestions
are in line with a proposition made by Seifert et al. (2008). The authors argue that in
immature markets, such as the carbon market, expectation building is not working well. In
such conditions frequent publication of emissions would improve expectation building in the
market.
The results of the previous section also point to another ￿ aw of the Scheme, which is
the ban on banking between Phases. The results show that this constraint increases the
Disposition e⁄ect at the beginning of each Phase. This ￿ aw is addressed by the literature
(among others see, Schleich et al., 2006 and Alberola et al., 2009). Indeed, in the proposal
for the Third Phase of ETS, the banking ban is dropped. This proposition could contribute
to the e¢ ciency of the carbon market. The installations would not have to face the lack of
information during the beginning of each Phase, and would be rewarded for carbon intensity,
which could be planned for the future and not limited to only one Phase.
155 Conclusions
There is a scarcity of literature dealing with the fundamentals of the carbon price. My
contribution to this literature is in presenting the ￿rst evidence of the Disposition e⁄ect
in the carbon market, based on the spot price of carbon permits on the BlueNext trading
platform from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009. The sample covers for the First and Second
Phases of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
In the paper I presented evidence for the Disposition e⁄ect, which increases as a result
of the institutional constraints, speci￿cally the ban on banking and the yearly submission
of the veri￿ed emissions. The estimated results indicate that the carbon price evolution is
a⁄ected by the Disposition e⁄ect during the ￿rst year of each Phase. I assert that the main
factor that drives the Disposition e⁄ect in the carbon market is information uncertainty.
I have found that these results are robust by using an alternative method of tracing the
Disposition e⁄ect. My results are in line with the previous evidence of the e¢ ciency of the
carbon market and ￿ndings that the Disposition has a positive e⁄ect on the evolution of
price in the market.
I have suggested possible alternatives to resolve uncertainty in the market. Speci￿cally,
I have suggested revealing the information on the actual emissions level throughout the year
and not only once a year. In addition, I suggest that more frequent submission of the veri￿ed
emissions could reduce the Disposition e⁄ect in the market and make it more e¢ cient. My
￿nding also point out that the banking ban increases the psychological e⁄ect during the ￿rst
year of each Phase.
It is worth mentioning, however, besides the possible policy implications outlined above
that these new results have an important implication for portfolio construction and risk
management. For further research it would be interesting to follow the evolution of the
carbon price during the rest of the Second Phase and see whether there are changes in
the market due to the alternations of institutional constraints in the Third Phase of the
Scheme. Although I present evidence on one of the well-documented behavioural anomalies
in the ￿nancial markets, there is place to extend current research and analyse the market for
another source of ine¢ ciency in the market. Detailed information on the identity of traders
16could potentially contribute to more accurate analysis and policy recommendations.
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Figure 1: The ￿gure shows the standardised log returns of carbon permit prices from 24
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Figure 2: The ￿gure shows the standardised log returns of carbon permit prices from 29
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Figure 3: The ￿gure shows the log returns of carbon permit prices from 24 June 2005 to 27
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Figure 4: The ￿gure shows the log returns of carbon permit prices from 29 February 2008
to 07 August 2009, including all together 32,997 observations.
23Figure 5: The ￿gure shows the evolution of alpha coe¢ cient for the First Phase of the
Scheme from 24 June 2005 to 27 February 2008, including all together 4,927 observations.
The dotted vertical lines point to the ￿rst and second compliance events, respectively.
24Figure 6: The ￿gure shows the evolution of alpha coe¢ cient for the Second Phase of the
Scheme from 29 February 2008 to 07 August 2009, including all together 32,997 observations.
The dotted vertical line points to the ￿rst compliance event.
25Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the series of standardised log returns
The two sample period run from 24 June 2005 to 13 August 2009. I excluding from the data
set observations related to trade of CERs, in order to concentrate only on the price evolution
of EUAs. I compute the log returns and standardise them by the standard deviation for the
day the log returns are computed. The total of observations is 37,924.
First Phase Second Phase
sample mean -0.031 -0.004
sample median 0.000 0.000
sample maximum 5.671 13.341
sample minimum -4.968 -11.127
sample standard deviation 0.999 1.000
sample skewness 0.036 0.389
sample kurtosis 5.001 18.017












26Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the series of logreturns
The two sample period run from 24 June 2005 to 13 August 2009. I exclude from the data set
observations related to trade of CERs, in order to concentrate only on the price evolution of
EUAs. The total of observations is 37,924.
First Phase Second Phase
sample mean -0.001 0.000
sample median 0.000 0.000
sample maximum 0.301 0.043
sample minimum -0.301 -0.029
sample standard deviation 0.022 0.001
sample skewness -1.558 0.781
sample kurtosis 52.502 51.274












27Table 3: Estimation results
I estimate by least squares the AR(1) and ARMA(1,1) models in Equation (1) for the First
and Second Phases, with period that runs from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009, including
all together 37,914 observations. For each parameter estimate, the ￿gures within parenthesis
refer to the White￿ s (1980) robust t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of Ljung-
Box￿ s test (1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The row sample size
reports the number of observations.
First Phase Second Phase






















Adj 0.322 0.208 0.401 0.222
Q-stat. 0.367 0.000 0.367 0.000
sample size 4,914 4,915 32,997 32,997
28Table 4: Robustness analysis: Sub-sampling and speci￿cation
I estimate by least squares ARMA(1,1) model in Equation (1) for the period that runs from
24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009, including all together 37,914 observations. The columns of
￿ subsample estimations￿consider yearly subsamples and columns of ￿ alternative speci￿cation￿
consider capital gains variable with alternative reference. For each parameter estimate, the
￿gures within parenthesis refer to the White￿ s (1980) t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports
Q-statistics of Ljung-Box￿ s test (1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The
row sample size reports the number of observations.
sub-sample estimations altrenative specifcation












































Adj 0.324 0.335 0.288 0.376 0.412 0.326 0.404
Q-stat. 0.933 0.691 0.187 0.920 0.673 0.978 0.367
sample size 628 3,055 1,240 9,543 23,454 4,697 32,970
29Table 5: Robustness analysis: ARMA-GARCH
I estimate by maximum likelihood the ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) models in Equations (3) and
(5) for the First and Second Phases, with period that runs from 24 June 2005 to 07 August
2009 , including all together 37,914 observations. For each parameter estimate, the ￿gures
within parenthesis refer to the t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of Ljung-
Box￿ s test (1979). The row ARCH LM reports the p-value of Engle￿ s (1982) LM test for
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity up to order 13. The row sample size reports the
number of observations.




























ARCH LM 0.999 0.999
sample size 4,915 32,984
30Table 6: Estimation results for Disposition e⁄ect in the First Phase
I estimate by least squares the ARMA(1,1) model in Equation (1) for the First Phase, with
data for the period that runs from 24 June 2005 to 27 February 2008, including all together
4,925 observations. For each parameter estimate, the ￿gures within parenthesis refer to the
White￿ s (1980) robust t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of Ljung-Box￿ s test
(1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The row sample size reports the
number of observations.
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E Panel F Panel G












































Adj 0.324 0.335 0.346 0.329 0.356 0.255 0.228
Q-stat. 0.933 0.375 0.885 0.944 0.850 0.631 0.499
sample size 628 422 500 2133 614 321 305
31Table 7: Estimation results for Disposition e⁄ect in the Second Phase
I estimate by least squares the ARMA(1,1) model in Equation (1) for the Second Phase, with
data for the period that runs from 08 April 2008 to 07 August 2009, including all together
32,997 observations. For each parameter estimate, the ￿gures within parenthesis refer to the
White￿ s (1980) robust t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of Ljung-Box￿ s test
(1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The row sample size reports the
number of observations.
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D


























Adj 0.376 0.444 0.411 0.396
Q-stat. 0.920 0.745 0.885470 0.894
sample size 9,543 6,394 6,722 10,388
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